RIGHT NOT TO BE BORN-NEW JERSEY
BECOMES THE THIRD STATE TO
RECOGNIZE WRONGFUL LIFE AS A
CAUSE OF ACTION
On June 9, 1977, during the first trimester of her pregnancy,
Mrs. Rosemarie Procanik consulted Drs. Joseph Cillo, Herbert
Langer, and Ernest Greenberg.' At that time, Mrs. Procanik reported to Dr. Cillo that she had recently been diagnosed as having contracted measles, but she was unsure whether it was
German measles. 2 Because a woman who has contracted German
measles during her pregnancy runs an increased risk of giving
birth to a child with defects, 3 Dr. Cillo immediately ordered a test
for rubella.4 Although the results of that test indicated a past infection of rubella, Dr. Cillo did not order further tests to ascertain when Mrs. Procanik had been infected. 5 Instead, he
incorrectly interpreted those results as indicating that Mrs. Procanik had become immune to German measles during her childhood.6 Accordingly, he advised her that she need not be

I Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 343, 478 A.2d 755, 757-58 (1984). The three
doctors were "board-certified obstetricians and gynecologists" engaged in group
practice. Id. Mrs. Procanik had been under their care for the previous year. Brief
on Behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Procanik v. CiUo, No. A-5446-80-TI (N.J.
Super. Ct., App. Div. 1983), afd in part and rev'd in part, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Brief].
2 Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 343, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984).
3 There is no consensus regarding the exact probability of giving birth to a
child with defects under these conditions. If rubella, commonly known as German
measles, has been contracted within the first trimester of pregnancy, there is at least
a 15% chance of defects. However, the probability of birth defects may rise as high
as 50% if rubella is contracted within the first month of pregnancy. 4B R. GRAY,
ATrORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE
305.41 (1984).
4 Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 343, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984). The Rubella
Titer Test, which Dr. Cillo ordered, can determine with a high degree of accuracy
whether a woman has contracted German measles by demonstrating the presence
of an anti-rubella titer in the blood serum. Kass & Shaw, The Risk of Birth Defects:
Jacobs v. Theimer and Parents' Right to Know, 2 AM.J. LAw & MED. 213, 221 (197677).
5 Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 343, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984).
6 Id. Dr. Cillo should have known that " '[tihe presence of antibody denotes an
immune response to Rubella viremia that may have been acquired anywhere from a
very few weeks to many years earlier.' " Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 1, at 5 (quotation
omitted). Thus, the presence of antibody was insufficient in itself as a basis for
determining when Mrs. Procanik's immunity had occurred and Dr. Cillo should
have ordered further tests.
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concerned. 7 Relying on the doctor's assurances, Mrs. Procanik allowed her pregnancy to continue, and on December 26, 1977,
she gave birth to a son, Peter.8 Within a month, Peter was diagnosed as having congenital rubella syndrome, a condition characterized by multiple birth defects. 9
One year after Peter's birth, Mr. and Mrs. Procanik consulted an attorney, Mr. Harold Sherman, regarding a possible
medical malpractice suit.' ° After contacting Mr. Lee Goldsmith
of the law firm of Greenstone, Greenstone and Naishuler,"I Mr.
Sherman advised the Procaniks on May 2, 1979, that they did not
have a cause of action against the doctors. 12 In giving that advice,
Mr. Sherman failed to inform his clients that the New Jersey
Supreme Court had granted certification in Berman v. Allan, 3 a
case that involved a "wrongful birth" claim. 4 Mr. Sherman also
failed to inform the Procaniks of the supreme court's subsequent
holding in Berman v. Allan'S-that parents may recover damages
for the wrongful birth of a child. 6 Relying on the advice of their
attorney, the Procaniks did not pursue any legal action against
the doctors and, as a result, on January 16, 1980, the statute of
limitations ran on their potential claim.' 7
On April 8, 1981, after seeking legal advice from another
Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 343, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984).
Id. at 343-44, 478 A.2d at 758.
9 Id. at 344, 478 A.2d at 758. Peter suffered from eye lesions, heart disease,
and hearing defects. Id. Such defects are typical of rubella syndrome, which can
also result in underdevelopment of the head, inflammation of the brain and spinal
cord, and mental retardation. Kass & Shaw, supra note 4, at 222.
10 Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 344-45, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984).
I1 Id. at 345, 478 A.2d at 758. Mr. Sherman consulted Mr. Goldsmith because
Goldsmith's firm specialized in medical malpractice. Id.
12 Id.
13 78 N.J. 325, 395 A.2d 194 (1978). Berman was certified on September 5,1978,
almost eight months prior to the time when Mr. Sherman rendered his advice to the
Procaniks. Id.
14 See Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 345, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984). While
courts and commentators have not always been consistent in their terminology, the
term "wrongful birth" has generally been used to designate a claim brought by
parents on their own behalf, alleging that negligent medical advice or treatment
failed to disclose a risk of birth defects to their unborn child, thereby depriving
them of their option to avoid or terminate the pregnancy. Comment, "|rong/il
Life".- The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 484 (1980). This cause of action
was first recognized in New Jersey in Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8
(1979).
15 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
16 See Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 345, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984) (citing
Berman, 80 N.J. at 433-34, 404 A.2d at 14-15).
17 Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 1984) (statute of limitations for personal injuries).
7
8
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attorney, the Procaniks instituted a suit in the New Jersey Superior Court.' 8 In the first count of the complaint, Peter, through
his mother and guardian ad litem, alleged that Drs. Cillo, Langer,
and Greenberg had negligently deprived his parents of their option to terminate the pregnancy.' 9 That count further alleged
that their negligence resulted in Peter's birth with congenital ru2
bella syndrome.2 ° On the basis of this "wrongful life" claim, '
Peter sought general damages for pain and suffering and for a
"diminished childhood. ' 2 2 In the second count, the Procaniks
sought damages for emotional distress and for the substantial
medical costs attributable to their son's birth defects. 23 A legal
malpractice claim against the Procaniks' former attorneys was set
forth in the third and final count.2 4
The defendant doctors moved for partial summary judgment
dismissing the wrongful life claim brought by Peter. 25 The trial
court granted the motion on the ground that the claim failed to
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.2 6 In
addition, the court held that the parents' claim against the docProcanik v. Ciilo, 97 N.J. 339, 344, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984).
19 Id. at 343, 478 A.2d at 757.
20 Id. at 342, 478 A.2d at 757.
21 A wrongful life claim is considered to be the complement of a wrongful birth
claim. This terminology has generally been used to designate a claim brought on
behalf of a deformed infant in situations where negligent medical advice or treatment has deprived the parents of the option to avoid or terminate the pregnancy.
Comment, supra note 14, at 483-85. Compare this definition with the definition of
wrongful birth set forth at supra note 14.
22 See Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 343, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (1984). A diminished childhood claim is based on an assertion that there has been an adverse impact on the child due to the impaired capacity of his parents to cope with his
problems. See id. at 363, 478 A.2d at 768 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (indicating that diminished childhood should be an element of
compensable damages).
23 Id. at 343, 478 A.2d at 757. It is typical for such medical costs to be extensive.
Even if a child with birth defects is not institutionalized, there are costs for medication, nursing and supervision, and special therapy and training. With respect to
children suffering from rubella syndrome, there may be expenses for surgery for
heart defects, cataracts, and other impairments. See, e.g., Robak v. United States,
658 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1981) (two operations for cataracts in addition to special therapy and training); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 25, 227 A.2d 689, 690
(1967) (several eye operations, as well as special training); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975) (numerous operations for heart defect).
24 Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 343, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (1984). The legal malpractice claim was asserted against Harold Sherman, Lee Goldsmith, and the law
firm of Greenstone, Greenstone and Naishuler. Id.
25 Id. at 342, 478 A.2d at 757.
26 Id.
18
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tors was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.2 7 The
plaintiffs appealed. While the appeal was pending, Peter moved
to amend the first count of the complaint, in order to assert a
claim for special damages to cover the extraordinary medical expenses that he would incur as an adult.2 8 The appellate division
denied the motion to amend without prejudice,29 and it affirmed
the lower court's dismissal of the wrongful life count.3
In 1983, the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. 3 ' The primary issue on appeal was the propriety of the partial summary judgment dismissing the wrongful life claim for
general damages; the supreme court felt compelled, however, to
consider Peter's additional claim for special damages, even
though that claim had not been raised before the trial court and
had not been considered by the appellate division.32 The
supreme court also considered whether the parents' claim
against the doctors was properly barred by the statute of
limitations. 33
On August 1, 1984, in Procanik v. C1Uo, 34 the supreme court
gave partial recognition to the wrongful life cause of action and
held that Peter could recover special damages for the extraordinary medical costs attributable to his affliction . 3 5 The Procanik
court, however, refused to allow Peter to recover general damages for emotional distress or for an impaired childhood. 6 In
addition, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that
27 Id. at 344, 478 A.2d at 758; see supra note 17 (setting forth applicable statute
of limitations). In discussing the trial court's rulings, Justice Pollock noted that the
parents "knew they had a potential cause of action by January 1978, nearly three
years before instituting suit." Id. The trial court did not rule, however, on the malpractice claim against the attorneys. Id. at 345, 478 A.2d at 758.
28 Id. at 344, 478 A.2d at 758. These expenses included not only medical costs,
but also expenses for nursing and related health care services. Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 342, 478 A.2d at 757.
31 Procanik v. Cillo, 95 N.J. 176, 470 A.2d 403 (1983).
32 Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 344, 478 A.2d 755, 758 (1984). The court
asserted that it was persuaded to consider the child's claim for special damages
because of considerations of "fairness, justice, and judicial efficiency." Id.
33 Id. The parents contended that their claim was derived from that of their son,
and therefore should not be barred, because N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2.1 (West
1984) tolls the statute of limitations during infancy. Procanik, 97 N.J. at 344, 378
A.2d at 758.
34 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
35 Id. at 342-43, 478 A.2d at 757. Procauik was a 6-1-1 decision with one member
of the court, Justice Schreiber, dissenting from the majority's recognition of the
wrongful life action. See id. at 369-72, 478 A.2d at 772-73 (Schreiber, J., dissenting
in part).
36 Id. at 343, 478 A.2d at 757. Another member of the court, Justice Handler,
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the Procaniks' claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 7
Finally, in light of its recognition of Peter's right to recover for
his extraordinary medical expenses, the court noted that even if
the parents' claim had not been barred, they could not recover a
second time for those expenses. 8
In recognizing a wrongful life cause of action in Procanik, the
New Jersey Supreme Court overruled case law that had existed
for nearly two decades. In 1967, the supreme court in Gleitman v.
Cosgrove 39 first considered a wrongful life claim brought against a
physician on behalf of a deformed infant.40 In support of that
claim, the Gleitmans alleged that they might have chosen to terminate the pregnancy had they been properly advised by their
doctor of the risk of birth defects to their unborn child. 4 ' Moreover, the parents brought claims on their own behalf and sought
recovery for the emotional anguish that they had suffered and the
incurred in caring for their child due to his
costs that they had
'4
"wrongful birth."

2

The Gleitman court held that the parents had suffered no
damages cognizable at law. 4 3 Furthermore, it stated that, even if
such damages were cognizable, a claim for wrongful birth would
be precluded by public policy supporting the precious nature of
human life.4 4 With respect to the infant plaintiff's wrongful life
argued that general damages should be recoverable in a wrongful life suit. See id.at
356-69, 478 A.2d at 764-72 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37 Id. at 356, 478 A.2d at 764. The court concluded that the parents' suit was
not derivative of the infant's claim. It asserted that the parents' right to recover
derived from an injury to their own independent rights, rather than from an injury
to their child. Id. at 356, 478 A.2d at 764. Accordingly, recognition of the infant's
claim "[did] not resuscitate the expired independent claim of the parents." Id.
38

Id.

39 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
40 See id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. The Gleitman decision has been recognized as
"the leading 'wrongful life' case." Comment, supra note 14, at 486.
41 Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. The risk was due to Mrs. Gleitman's
exposure to German measles during her pregnancy. Id.
42 Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. Not only must wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions be distinguished from each other, but each must be distinguished from
"wrongful pregnancy" and "dissatisfied life" actions. A wrongful pregnancy claim
may be brought by parents in situations where a healthy, but unwanted baby has
been born. A dissatisfied life claim may arise when a healthy child seeks damages
for his illegitimate birth. Comment, supra note 14, at 483-87.
43 Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. The Gleitman court specifically stated
that the "intangible, unmeasurable, and complex human benefits" of motherhood
and fatherhood made it impossible to measure the damages inuring to the parents
of a child born with birth defects. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
44 Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. Policy reasons also prevented an award of damages
to the parents on the grounds that a child's right to live took precedence over any
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claim, the court was even more emphatic. Writing for the court,
Justice Proctor stressed that the conduct of the doctors was not
the cause of the plaintiff's impairment.4 5 Therefore, according to
the court, the plaintiff, in asserting a wrongful life cause of action, maintained that but for the doctor's negligence, he would
not have sustained birth defects because he would not have been
born at all-"In other words . . . his very life [was] 'wrongful.' "46 The Gleitman court concluded that it could not award
damages to the deformed infant because to do so would compel
of life with impairments against the
the court to "weigh the value
47
nonexistence of life itself."
In the years immediately following the Gleitman decision, the
highest court of only one other jurisdiction considered a case involving claims of wrongful life and wrongful birth. 48 That court
also refused to recognize such claims. 4 9 After the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 5° however, wrongful birth and wrongful life claims began to appear
with greater frequency. 5 ' The parents' claim for wrongful birth
was first to gain acceptance. 5 2 Once it was established that a woright the parents might have not to bear the emotional and financial burdens of
raising their child. Id.
45 Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
46 Id.
47 Id. Justice Weintraub, who dissented 'from the majority with respect to the
wrongful birth claim, nevertheless agreed with the majority regarding the claim for
wrongful life. In a passage often quoted in subsequent cases, he said that
"[u]ltimately, the infant's complaint is that he would be better off not to have been
born. Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot possibly know
whether that is so." Id. at 63, 227 A.2d at 711 (Weintraub, J., dissenting in part).
48 Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup.
Ct. 1968) (wrongful life claim brought on behalf of child denied; wrongful birth
claim brought by parents upheld), modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970)
(wrongful birth ruling reversed), affid mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332
N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
49 Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 696, 283 N.E.2d 616,
617, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (1972).
50 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 App. Div. 2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1975)
(dismissing claim for wrongful birth, even though alleged negligent acts occurred
after Legislature had legalized abortions performed within 24 weeks of conception); cases cited infra note 52.
52 See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (recognizing wrongful birth cause of action); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (same); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57
A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (same); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846
(Tex. 1975) (same); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d
372 (1975) (same).

886

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:880

man had the constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy,5 3
the public policy argument against recognition of the wrongful
birth action was substantially weakened.5 4 Accordingly, courts
began to hold that the failure of a physician to advise a woman of
the possibility of birth defects in her unborn child would lead to
damages cognizable at law, because such failure deprived a woman of a meaningful opportunity to exercise the right to terminate her pregnancy.5 5 In 1979, the New Jersey Supreme Court
followed that trend in the law by overruling its earlier wrongful
birth holding in Gleitman. In Berman, the supreme court held that
the parents of a child wrongfully born with birth defects could
recover monetary damages for emotional distress.5 6 Wrongful
birth actions are now recognized in all jurisdictions that have
considered the issue. 7
In marked contrast to the acceptance of wrongful birth
causes of action, wrongful life claims continued to be denied
throughout the 1970's.58 The only court that accorded recognition to such claims was the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York, which decided two companion cases in December 1977. 5 ' Although those decisions initially seemed to
53 In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court held that the constitutional
right of privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy." Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
54 The New Jersey Supreme Court made this explicit in Berman v. Allan. See supra
note 14. The Berman court noted that, in view of the Roe decision, public policy
now supported the proposition that a woman should not be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to make the decision to abort. Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at
14.
55 See Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
56 Id. at 434, 404 A.2d at 15.
57 See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); and Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 351, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 478, 656 P.2d 483, 494 (1983); see also cases
cited supra note 52.
58 See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (plaintiffs sustained no damages cognizable at law); Lapoint v. Shirley, 409 F.
Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (no cause of action for wrongful life because no proximate cause); Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (wrongful
life claim denied); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (same); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (plaintiffs sustained no damages cognizable at
law);Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1977) (issue not reached, as defendants held not negligent); Karlsons v. Guerinot,
57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (wrongful life claim denied); Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (same).
59 In Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), revd sub nom.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), the
appellate division upheld a lower court ruling denying the defendants' motion to
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mark a breakthrough for wrongful life claims, both decisions
were quickly reversed by the New York Court of Appeals.6"
Two years later, a California court of appeals upheld the
wrongful life cause of action in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories. 6 Because of deficiencies in the Curlender court's reasoning
and conclusions, however, the decision was deprived of much potential significance.6 2 In reaching its decision, the Curlender court
glossed over any differences between the wrongful life claim and
a traditional medical malpractice claim. 6 3 Consistent with this approach, the court allowed general damages for pain and suffering
as well as special damages for financial losses attributable to the
child's affliction.6 4 Because the Curlender court failed to focus on
the distinctive features of the wrongful life claim, its decision was
to have little, if any, precedential value.6 5
In 1980 and 1981, wrongful life claims were raised in three
additional jurisdictions, and in each case recognition of the claim
was refused.6 6 Then, in 1982, came the major breakthrough that
dismiss a wrongful life claim, even though it admitted there was no precedent for its
ruling. Park, 60 A.D.2d at 82, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 112. In the companion case of
Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), revd, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), the appellate division reversed the trial
court's dismissal of a wrongful life claim for failure to state a cause of action, citing
its decision in Park. Becker, 60 A.D.2d at 588, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
60 See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978).
61 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). The Curlender action was
brought on behalf of a child who was afflicted with Tay-Sachs syndrome, a fatal
affliction resulting in a very reduced life span. Id. at 816 & n.4, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480
& n.4.
62 Symptomatic of these deficiencies was the Curlender court's dictum that parents were potentially liable in a wrongful life action if they chose to proceed with a
pregnancy, knowing that the child would be born with defects. Id. at 830, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 488. Shortly thereafter, California passed legislation relieving parents of
any liability in a situation such as this. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 228,
643 P.2d 954, 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 (1982).
63 Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. The opinion emphasized that "[tihe reality of the 'wrongful life' concept is that such a plaintiff exists and
suffers, due to the negligence of others .

.

.

. We need not be concerned with the

fact that had defendants not been negligent, the plaintiff might not have come into
existence at all." Id. (emphasis in original).
64 Id. at 831-32, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. Damages for pain and suffering were
allowed for the limited life span of the child, which was estimated to be approximately four years. Id.
65 The Curlender decision was not followed even when the California Supreme
Court later recognized the wrongful life cause of action. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
66 See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1981); Moores v. Lucas,
405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App.
351, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); see also Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110
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proponents of the cause had been hoping for. The California
Supreme Court became the first state supreme court to consider
and recognize wrongful life as a cause of action when it rendered
its decision in Turpin v. Sortini.6 7
The Turpin court considered a claim brought by parents on
behalf of their daughter, who was born with hereditary deafness. 6 8 The parents sought both general damages for an alleged
right of a child to be born without defects, and special damages
for the extraordinary expenses that their daughter would incur as
a result of her affliction. 6 9 In reaching its decision, the Turpin
court examined the reasoning applied by the California court of
appeals in Curlender, but declined to adopt it. 70 Instead, the California Supreme Court in Turpin addressed what it regarded as the
basic objection to the wrongful life cause of action-the notion
that public policy mandated the conclusion that impaired life is
to be preferred to nonlife as a matter of law and that recognition
of the wrongful life claim would implicitly " 7'disavow'
the sanctity
1
and value of less-than-perfect human life."
The Turpin court had a dual response to that objection. First,
it noted simply that it did not believe that awarding damages to a
child with severe birth defects would disavow the sanctity of
life.7 2 Second, the court refused to accept the assertion that California's public policy established that, as a matter of law, impaired life was always preferable to nonlife. 73 It noted, for
example, that the California Legislature had found that an adult
whose condition was terminal had the right to decide whether to
(1981) (upholding earlier Pennsylvania case law denying wrongful life cause of
action).
67 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
68 Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339. The parents additionally
alleged that the doctors had misdiagnosed their older daughter Hope, who was also
born deaf, and whose condition, if properly diagnosed, would have revealed a significant probability of defects in any future offspring. Id. at 224-25, 643 P.2d at 965,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
69 Id. at 225, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
70 Id. at 232, 643 P.2d at 960-61, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344. Noting the fact that the
infant plaintiff never had a chance to be born whole, and that the defendants had
not caused the child's defects, the court criticized the Curlender analysis since it ignored the basis of the defendants' alleged wrong and thereby failed to distinguish
between wrongful life and ordinary prenatal injury claims. Id.
71 Id. at 233, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (citing Berman, 80 N.J. at
430, 404 A.2d at 13).
72 Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45. The Turpin court did
not provide any reasons for its assertion. Therefore, its position was little more
than an evasion of the issue.
73 Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
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have life-sustaining procedures withdrawn."4 The court admitted,
however, that such a finding was not applicable to the present
case because, although a jury might conclude that some conditions are worse than no life at all, such a conclusion was unlikely
where the plaintiff's only affliction was deafness.75
Without further discussing the validity of the wrongful life
action, the Turpin court focused on the question of general damages. The court asserted that, in the context of a wrongful life
claim, "a rational, nonspeculative determination of a specific
monetary award . . .appears to be outside the realm of human

competence. ' ' 76 The court concluded, however, that special damages for medical costs should be allowed, because they were
readily ascertainable.7 7 In addition, the court opined that it
would be illogical to allow the child's medical costs to be recovered by the parents but not by the child, especially since the par78
ents might be unable to bring suit under certain circumstances.
The Turpin court's decision was based largely on the importance
that it placed on assuring recovery for the child's extraordinary
medical expenses. By limiting recovery in that manner, the court
was also able to avoid the criticism that recovery for wrongful life
would implicitly disavow the sanctity of life.7 9
The Turpin decision was followed in 1983 by Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc.," a case involving two infants born with birth
defects, allegedly as a result of the mother's use of Dilantin during pregnancy.81 In Harbeson, the Washington Supreme Court
followed closely the reasoning of the Turpin court, both in recognizing the wrongful life action 2 and in allowing specific, but not
74 Id. The Turpin court admitted that an unborn child cannot make such a decision. However, it added that parents, in deciding whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy, presumably take into account not only their own interests, but also the
interests of their unborn child. Id.
75 Id. at 235, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
76 Id. at 237, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347. In addition, the Turpin court
cited the "benefit doctrine." Pursuant to this doctrine, damages for an injury must
be mitigated by the value of any benefit conferred by the defendant's tortious conduct. Id. In a wrongful life action, this is particularly appropriate. As the court
noted, the plaintiff had received a physical life, along with the capacity to both give
and receive love, and to experience pain as well as suffering. Id.
77 Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
78 Id.
79 See supra text accompanying note 71.
80 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
81 Id. at 462-63, 656 P.2d at 486.
82 Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497. Adopting the Turpin court's view of the problem,
the Harbesoncourt raised the question whether recognition "would represent a disavowal of the sanctity of a less-than-perfect human life." Id. at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
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general damages.8 3 The most distinctive aspect of the Harbeson
court's decision was its effort to fit the wrongful life action into
the traditional tort system-something the Turpin court had not
attempted to do.8 4 The Harbeson court rejected the argument that
there was no injury and no proximate cause in a wrongful life
action because the doctors' negligence had not caused the infants' defects.8 5 Instead, the court stated that but for the negligence of the doctors, the infant plaintiffs would not have
incurred the extraordinary medical expenses incident to their
condition. 6 From this, it concluded that a finder of fact could
properly determine that the doctors' negligence was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.8 7
By the end of 1983, the wrongful life cause of action had
been recognized in California and Washington, 8 but rejected in
ten other jurisdictions,"8 including New Jersey.9 0 On August 1,
1984, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Procanik v.
Cillo" became the third court to recognize the wrongful life cause
of action. In granting such recognition, it also became the first
state supreme court to overrule its own prior decisions with respect to wrongful life claims. Accordingly, the decision of the
Procanik court supports the view that acceptance of the wrongful
life action is a growing trend, which is likely to win additional
adherents in the years ahead. It also indicates that recovery for
wrongful life claims will continue to be limited to special damages for extraordinary medical costs. Despite the impact of the
The Harbeson court did not analyze this issue, however, but simply asserted that to
award damages for medical costs arising from an infant's birth defects did not seem
to be such a disavowal. Id. at 482, 656 P.2d at 497.
83 Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497. The Harbeson court evinced an attitude similar to
that of the Turpin court in holding that the wrongful life cause of action was necessary to assure that the child's medical needs would be met. The majority felt that
since the child's needs would not suddenly disappear upon his attaining majority,
the burden of the medical expenses in many cases would fall on either the child's
parents or on the state. Id. at 479, 656 P.2d at 495.
84 Compare infra text accompanying notes 85-87 (discussing Harbeson) with supra
text accompanying notes 70-76 (discussing Turpin).
85 Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 483, 656 P.2d at 497.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 67 & 82.
89 New Jersey, Texas, Ohio, Wisconsin, New York, Alabama, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Florida, and Michigan were the ten jurisdictions that had denied
the wrongful life cause of action as of 1983. See supra notes 41, 55, 57 & 64.
90 The cause of action had first been denied recognition in Gleitman, and this
denial was later affirmed in Berman. See supra notes 38-46 & 56; infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
91 See Procanik, 97 N.J. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762.
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decision, however, the majority's opinion has left unanswered
some basic issues, which will need to be addressed in the future
as claims of this type continue to be brought before the courts. 2
As a prelude to its analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Procanik reviewed its prior decisions in both wrongful birth and
wrongful life cases.9 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Pollock
noted that in its 1967 decision in Gleitman, the court had declined
to recognize either cause of action. 4 He asserted that in the intervening years the court had reassessed the rights both of pregnant women and infants, primarily because of the decision by the
United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. 95 justice Pollock observed that the New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on Roe, had
recognized the wrongful birth action in Berman, and had allowed
the parents of a deformed child to recover damages for their
emotional suffering.9 6 At the same time, however, the Berman
court had denied recovery for medical and other expenses incurred in raising the child.9 7 The Berman majority, Justice Pollock
observed, also had "declined to recognize a cause of action in an
infant born with birth defects[,]" reasoning that even life with
serious defects is preferable to nonexistence.9 8 Finally, the Procanik majority noted that the supreme court's subsequent holding
in Schroeder v. Perkel 99 had modified the Berman decision by allowing recovery in a wrongful birth action for extraordinary medical, hospital and related expenses.' 0 0 Because no claim on behalf
of an infant had been raised in Schroeder, the court chose not to
accompanying notes 134 & 140 (identifying such issues).
Procanik, 97 N.J. at 345-47, 478 A.2d at 758-60. The court noted that it was
"survey[ing] again the changing landscape of family torts." Id. at 345, 478 A.2d at
758.
94 Id. at 345-46, 478 A.2d at 759; see supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
95 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 346, 478 A.2d at 759.
96 Id. at 346-47, 478 A.2d at 759.
97 Id. at 347, 478 A.2d at 759 (citing Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14).
The Berman court had noted that, in effect, the parents wanted to retain the benefits
of having a child, while placing the enormous financial burden of her rearing upon
the defendants. It concluded that this would constitute a windfall to the parents
and would place too great a burden upon the physicians. Berman, 80 N.J. at 432,
404 A.2d at 14.
98 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 347, 478 A.2d at 759 (citing Berman, 80 N.J. at 428-30, 404
A.2d at 12-13).
99 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
100 See Procanik, 97 N.J. at 347, 478 A.2d at 760 (citing Schroeder, 87 N.J. at 68, 432
A.2d at 841). The damages sought by the Schroeders were medical, hospital, and
pharmaceutical expenses necessary for their son's survival. These damages were
found to be proportionate to the wrong of defendants, unlike the normal expenses
of raising a child which had been sought by Mr. and Mrs. Berman. Schroeder, 87 N.J.
at 68, 432 A.2d at 841.
92 See infra text
93

892

SETON HALL L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:880

consider such a claim at that time.1 °1 In concluding its survey, the
Procanik court declared that the time for reconsideration of the
right of an infant to recover damages in a wrongful life claim had
0 2
arrived.'
The Procanik court began its analysis by recognizing that the
defendant doctors had owed a duty to the infant plaintiff, Peter
Procanik. 10 3 Justice Pollock assumed that the doctors had been
negligent in their treatment of Rosemarie Procanik, and that
their negligence had deprived her of the option of terminating
her pregnancy.'0 4 The court then indicated that the duty owed to
the child had been breached, though it did not offer any substantiation for that conclusion.'0 5
Having paid this brief homage to traditional tort terminology, the Procanik court next reviewed the policy considerations
that had led it to deny the wrongful life claim in the past. According to the court, the threshold problem of a wrongful life
claim arises from the implicit claim by the child that he should
not have been born. 10 6 In the court's view, that assertion ran
counter to the policy position "that life, no matter how burdened, is preferable to non-existence .. . 10 That policy had
been the basis of the court's holding in Berman-that the child
had suffered no injury cognizable at law.1 0 8 In addition, Justice
Pollock acknowledged that the supreme court previously had
been troubled by the difficulty in measuring damages for wrongful life. 10 9

Focusing primarily on the issue of assessing damages, the
Procanik court surveyed decisions in other jurisdictions that had
101 Schroeder, 87 N.J. at 66, 432 A.2d at 840.
102 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 347, 478 A.2d at 760.
103 Id. at 348, 478 A.2d at 760.
104 Id. at 348-49, 478 A.2d at 760.
105 Id. at 349, 478 A.2d at 760. There was no doubt that the doctor owed a duty
to both the infant, Peter Procanik, and to his mother. Additionally, the court properly presumed, for purposes of analysis, that the doctors breached their duty to
Rosemarie Procanik. That presumption, however, does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the doctors similarly breached their duty to the child. The court
unfortunately blurs this distinction and gives the impression that a breach of duty
was established. This deficiency in the court's analysis is evinced by the statement
that "[n]otwithstanding recognition of the existence of a duty and its breach, policy
considerations have led this Court in the past to decline to recognize any cause of
action in an infant for his wrongful life." Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id., 478 A.2d at 761.
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dealt with wrongful life claims. It recognized that two intermediate appellate courts had awarded general damages for wrongful
life, only to be overruled by the highest tribunals in their respective states. 1 ' Moreover, Justice Pollock observed that other
courts had found it impossible to overcome the problems posed
by the issue of damages. 1 Then, reviewing again the prior New
Jersey decisions on wrongful life, the Procanik court noted that
both the majority and dissent in Berman, as well as the dissenting
justices in Gleitman and Schroeder, had asserted that if such damages could be measured by acceptable standards, then recovery
would be appropriate." 2
The Procanik court's reference to Schroeder at that point in its
analysis must be viewed as significant. In Schroeder, the supreme
court had allowed recovery for extraordinary medical expenses in
a wrongful birth case, holding that such damages were not only
certain but predictable. 1 3 By implication, if the objection to a
wrongful life claim were simply that damages were impossible to
measure, then Schroeder's conclusion that extraordinary medical
expenses were predictable would make the claim acceptable.
That analysis was not completely apposite, however, because
Schroeder was a wrongful birth rather than a wrongful life case.
Thus, despite their predictability, the fact that medical expenses
are recoverable in the former instance does not necessarily mean
that they should be recoverable in the latter. A child's damages
do not necessarily follow from the fact that his parents have suffered an injury cognizable at law. The salient question is whether
the child himself has suffered such an injury.
While there was no express acknowledgment of this analytical problem, the Procanik court's awareness of it was evidenced by
the court's discussion of the interdependence of the family, a
theme previously developed in Schroeder. 1 4 Justice Pollock cited
language from the Schroeder opinion, which had described the
family as "a web of interconnected legal interests," in which a
direct injury to one member may also constitute an indirect in110 Id.; see Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (overruled by Turpin); Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d
587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), rev'd, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S. 110 (1977), rev'd sub nor.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
111 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 350, 478 A.2d at 761.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 351, 478 A.2d at 761.
114 Id. (citing Schroeder, 87 N.J. at 63-64, 432 A.2d at 839).
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jury to others.' 15 Utilizing that reasoning, the Procanik court declared that recovery of extraordinary medical expenses in a
wrongful life action, either by the parents or by the child, is justified by the fact that the doctor's negligence has an impact on the
entire family. 11 6
Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on that conclusion; rather, it relied upon principles of equity, asserting that
"[1]aw is more than an exercise in logic," and that logic must
yield when injustice would result." 7 Referring to the California
Supreme Court's assertion in Turpin that the right to recover
damages for extraordinary medical expenses should not be contingent upon the "wholly fortuitous circumstance of whether the
parents are available to sue," Justice Pollock concluded that the
Procanik case presented that very situation. I' 8 Although the parents' claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the court held
that the time bar would not operate absolutely to foreclose recovery for the medical treatment of their son, especially because
such expenses were reasonably predictable." 9 Accordingly, the
Procanik court held that either the child or his parents can recover
for extraordinary medical costs incurred during his infancy, and,
additionally, the child may recover those costs during his
majority.' 2 o
The Procanik court then provided additional support for its
holding. Justice Pollock viewed the court's decision as consonant
with decisions that had recently been rendered by the Supreme
Courts of California and Washington.' 2' In what may be viewed
as the most noteworthy portion of its opinion, the Procanik court
asserted that its decision "[was] not premised on the concept that
non-life is preferable to an impaired life, but [was] predicated on
the needs of the living. "122 The court emphasized that, in rendering its decision, it sought "only to respond to the call of the living
' 2
for help in bearing the burdens of their afflictions." 1 1
115

Id.

Id., 478 A.2d at 762. The court made it clear that recovery to both the parent
and child was impermissible. Id. at 356, 478 A.2d at 764.
117 Id. at 351-52, 478 A.2d at 762.
118 Id. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762 (citing Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 328, 643 P.2d at 965,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 348).
119 Id. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762.
120 Id.
121 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 67-79 & 80-87 (discussing Turpin and
Harbeson-decisionsthat accorded recognition to wrongful life cause of action).
122 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 353, 478 A.2d at 763.
123 Id.
116
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Having accorded recognition to Peter Procanik's wrongful
life claim for special damages, the supreme court next considered
the question of general damages for pain and suffering and for a
diminished childhood. It was there that Justice Pollock acknowledged the problems inherent in comparing an impaired life to
nonexistence. 124 In considering the question of general damages,
the Procanik court found that it was unable rationally to measure
25
or compare nonexistence with the suffering of an impaired life.'
The court, however, was commendably candid in acknowledging that this "irrationality" was not really at the root of its
rejection of recovery of general damages. The majority noted
that its rejection was based upon its evaluation that the judicial
system would be unable to deal with such claims because they
would necessarily arouse jurors' passions with respect to abortion, the value of life, and the fear of nonexistence. 26 Those issues were viewed by the court as "more than the judicial system
[could] digest."' 2 7
The Procanik court found the claim for diminished childhood
to be even more problematic. Such a claim is based on the contention that the infant suffers an impaired childhood because his
parents, unprepared for the birth of a defective child, are less
able to love and care for him. 12 ' The court recognized that the
claim contained an inherent contradiction where the parents
would have used the information that was negligently withheld
from them in order to prevent the birth of their child, rather than
to prepare for it.' 29 In addition, the court noted that the injury
allegedly suffered by the child was not easily divisible from that
30
incurred by the parents.
In the final portion of its opinion, the court dispensed with
the Procaniks' argument that their wrongful birth claim "should
[have been] viewed as derivative from the infant's claim and,
therefore, . . . should not have been dismissed."''
The court
noted that it had held in Schroeder that the parents' claim was independent of that of the child.' 3 2 Consequently, the Procaniks'

125

Id.
Id.

126

Id. at 354, 478 A.2d at 763.

127

Id.

128
129
130

Id., 478 A.2d at 763-64.
Id. at 355, 478 A.2d at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 356, 478 A.2d at 764. The court may have felt compelled to follow its

124

131

132

896

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:880

right to recover could arise only from an injury to their own in1 33
dependent rights, rather than from an injury to their child.
In rendering its decision, the majority adopted what may be
viewed as a compromise position. On the one hand, it recognized the wrongful life cause of action, at least to the extent of
granting recovery for special damages. On the other hand, it limited the action by not allowing recovery for general damages. In
so holding, the court steered a careful course between those who
would deny recognition to the wrongful life action and those who
would place it on an equal footing with an action for wrongful
birth. 34 The majority's position may also be viewed as progressive, in that it advanced the law in an area that is still controversial, but in such a way as to render that position judicially

acceptable. 135
The rationale underlying the Procanik decision, however, is
highly vulnerable. The majority failed to deal adequately with
several substantive issues, including whether there is a cognizable injury to the child and whether recognition of such an injury
is tantamount to holding that nonexistence is preferable to an
impaired life.' 36 Moreover, the majority failed to provide a cogent theory of its own to support recognition of the wrongful life
action. 137 Accordingly, the Procanik court left in doubt not only
the basis, but also the significance of its decision. 138 It also left
own precedent in Schroeder, since it had rendered that decision just three years
earlier.
133 Id.
134 When the wrongful birth cause of action was recognized in Berman, recovery
was granted for mental and emotional anguish. See Berman, 80 N.J. at 434, 404 A.2d
at 15. In Schroeder, recovery in the wrongful birth action was also granted for medical costs attributable to the child's defects. See Schroeder, 87 N.J. at 68-69, 432 A.2d
at 841-42. Thus, at the time of Procanik, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed
both special and general damages for the wrongful birth cause of action. In the
wrongful life cause of action, however, the Procanik court allowed only special damages for extraordinary medical expenses. See Procanik, 97 N.J. at 356, 478 A.2d at
764.
135 Dicta in the court's opinion indicates that this is the majority's own view of its
decision. See supra text accompanying note 127.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 114-16 & 122-25.
137 See supra text accompanying note 117. The court's failure to provide a cogent
theory is signaled by its open resort to principles of equity. See Procanik, 97 N.J. at
351-52, 478 A.2d at 762.
138 The majority's resort to principles of equity inevitably raises the question
whether recognition of the wrongful life claim in this case was based solely on the
fact that the parents' own claim had expired. If the decision is viewed simply in this
light, its precedential value is vitiated considerably.
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the decision open to attack, both by those favoring a fuller recognition of the action and by those opposing it completely.
The majority did not have to wait for such attacks to be
launched by other courts or commentators. Justice Handler, in
his dissent, analyzed the weaknesses of the majority's position,
and he argued that the court should have allowed recovery for
general as well as special damages. 13 9 Equally incisive was the
dissent of Justice Schreiber,' 4 ° who refused to recognize the
cause of action in any form. 4 ' Not surprisingly, both dissenters
focused on the same initial question, which they felt the majority
had failed to answer: whether there is a cognizable tort in the
wrongful life cause of action.14

Justice Handler claimed that the majority had not only failed
to discuss this question adequately, but had also expressly rejected
the claim that the child had suffered a cognizable tort.143 Instead,
according to Justice Handler, the majority's recognition of the
child's right to special damages was really an extension of the
parents' right of recovery. 144 He asserted that the majority had
taken that position because it believed that any explicit recognition of an injury to the child, cognizable at law, would require
acceptance of the proposition that nonexistence could be prefer139 Procanih, 97 N.J. at 356-69, 478 A.2d at 764-72 (Handler,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
140 Between the rendering of the Procanik decision and the present, Justice
Schreiber has retired from the New Jersey Supreme Court, having reached the
mandatory retirement age. With Justice Schreiber's retirement, the supreme court
has lost its last member to espouse the position orginally presented in Gleitmanthat the value of an impaired life cannot be weighed against nonexistence.
141 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 369-72, 478 A.2d at 772-73 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in
part).
142 Justice Handler stated this question explicitly. Id. at 357, 478 A.2d at 765
(Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While Justice Schreiber
cast his objections in terms of causation rather than a cognizable injury, one is readily reducible to the other. Justice Schreiber, like Justice Handler, acknowledged
that the underlying problem of recognizing a cognizable tort is the policy against
holding that nonexistence can be preferable to life. Id. at 369, 478 A.2d at 772
(Schreiber, J., dissenting in part). Without such a holding, it is impossible under
traditional tort concepts to identify an injury to the child. Hence, there can be no
causation either, because the defects that the child was born with are not causally
related to the physician's negligence.
143 Despite the majority's apparent recognition of the wrongful life action, Justice
Handler asserted that the court's opposition to the child's cause of action had
"hardened into an explicit holding." Id. at 357, 478 A.2d at 765 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144 Id. at 358, 478 A.2d at 765 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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14 5

able to life.
In response to that position, Justice Handler presented an
ingenious theory of his own. He sought to establish not only that
wrongful life is based on a cognizable tort, but also that it is unnecessary for the court to take any position with respect to the
preference of nonexistence over life. 46 He did this initially by
further developing the concept of the familial tort,'4 7 which the
majority had invoked for the limited purpose ofjustifying recovery for extraordinary medical expenses. 4 8
According to Justice Handler, deprivation of the parents'
right to make an informed choice regarding termination of the
pregnancy is a prerequisite to the child's wrongful life claim.' 4 9
That deprivation is an injury to the parents, and as Justice Handler noted, one that the court had already recognized in granting
damages for emotional suffering in a wrongful birth cause of action.' 5 ° He insisted, however, that emotional suffering has many
facets, including guilt and shock, which he joined together under
the term "diminished parental capacity.""'S' As a result of this diminished capacity, parents become less able to care for and to
cope with the needs of their child. 5 2 This, in turn, inevitably has
Id.
Id. This theory is one which Justice Handler has developed over the years. It
first appeared in Berman, 80 N.J. at 434-46, 404 A.2d at 15-21 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and later appeared in Schroeder, 87 N.J. 72-78,
432 A.2d at 843-46 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147 Although Justice Pollock and Justice Handler both discussed the concept of a
familial tort, only Justice Handler actually employed this terminology. See Procanik,
97 N.J. at 369, 478 A.2d at 771 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 114-16 (for majority's discussion of familial
tort).
149 See Procanik, 97 N.J. at 358, 478 A.2d at 765 (Handler, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
150 Id. at 363, 478 A.2d at 768 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
151 This term was first used by Justice Handler in Berman. Berman, 80 N.J. at 440,
404 A.2d at 18 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his opinion in Procanik, Justice Handler went to great lengths to establish the reality of diminished parental capacity, citing numerous works dealing with families with
handicapped children. Procanik, 97 N.J. at 358-63, 478 A.2d at 765-68 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). This extensive treatment was necessitated by the fact that such alleged diminished parental capacity has never been recognized as a grounds for damages, although general emotional suffering has been
established as a basis for recovery.
152 Even if such diminished parental capacity were in fact a reality, there is a
question whether it could be the basis for granting damages. In such a claim, the
parents would declare, in effect, that they were less able to care for their child because they were deprived of their right to prevent its birth. Although Justice
145
146
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an adverse impact on the child in the form of "a diminished
childhood."' 53 Thus, according to Justice Handler, the cognizable tort in54 the wrongful life action is that of diminished
childhood. 1

In delineating this familial tort, Justice Handler claimed that
its recognition would not oblige the court to "assume a Hamlet
role," that is, to decide whether nonexistence could be preferred
over a life that was burdened.' 55 Rather, the court's only obligation would be to recognize that individuals have the right to
make such a choice for themselves.' 56 ForJustice Handler, this is
a fundamental right, at least in a "necessitous or exigent setting.'" 7 He identified the right as one of personal autonomy 15s
and asserted that a court or a jury could validate the right without
making a moral judgment of its own.' 59 Therefore, in his view,
the decisive issue is not the value of life, but rather the right of
individual choice. 16 0
If the basic issue in a wrongful life case is the right of individual choice, then the objection could be raised that it is the parHandler did not discuss this aspect of the issue, the majority explicitly identified the
contradiction involved. See Procanik, 97 N.J. at 354, 478 A.2d at 763-64.
153 Id. at 363, 478 A.2d at 768 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The claim of diminished childhood requires that the concept of diminished
parental capacity first be accepted. This explains the extensive effort by Justice
Handler to establish the concept. See id.
154 Id. at 358-63, 478 A.2d at 765-68 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155 Id. at 358, 478 A.2d at 765 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
156 Id. at 358-66, 478 A.2d at 765-70 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157 Id. at 368, 478 A.2d at 771 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Although Justice Handler did not discuss the question, this putative right
would apparently embrace the right to die. Such a right is implicit injustice Handler's formulation of the wrongful life cause of action.
158 Id. at 364, 478 A.2d at 769 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
159 Id. at 365, 478 A.2d at 769 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
160 Justice Handler's argument seems to be consciously resonant of the current
widespread debate regarding abortion, in which the two opposing positions assert,
on one hand, the value of life, and on the other, the right of individual choice.
Justice Handler has undoubtedly adopted the view that Roe v. Wade stands for a
fundamental right of personal autonomy, and has extended that principle in Procanik into the area of the wrongful life claim. Justice Handler's assertion that a
court or jury could validate an individual's right to choose nonexistence, without
making a moral judgment on its own, is suggestive of the position taken by Geraldine Ferraro and others in the 1984 presidential campaign-that a public official is
justified in supporting laws permitting abortion, even though personally opposed
to the practice.
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ents who have a cause of action and not the child, because it is
the parents' right to choose that was violated. Justice Handler
dealt with this problem by combining the two strands of his argument: the right of personal autonomy and the concept of a familial tort.' 6' He asserted that the parents' choice to abort is a
substitute judgment made on behalf of the child. 6 2 Therefore,
even though the parents exercise their own judgment, the child
does not lack a right of personal autonomy or self-determination.
On the contrary, in Justice Handler's view, the parents' choice
preserves the child's right. 6 3 Delicately balancing the concepts
of familial tort and individual autonomy, he concluded that the
injury in a wrongful life claim arises from the consequences that
flow from depriving parents of the ability to make a choice "for
themselves and their child as a family."'"
Like Justice Handler, Justice Schreiber believed that the majority had failed to answer the question whether there was a cognizable tort in the wrongful life cause of action. 165 Justice
Schreiber also believed, as did Justice Handler, that implicit in
the majority's decision was the understanding that the child's
cause of action was "fundamentally flawed."' 16 6 From this common criticism of the majority's position, however, Justice Schreiber drew a conclusion diametrically opposite to that of his
colleague. Rather than asserting that there indeed is a cogniza161 See Procanik, 97 N.J. at 364-66, 478 A.2d at 769-70 (Handler,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
162 Id. at 364, 478 A.2d at 769 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
163 Id.
164 Id. In a wrongful life action, the particular consequence that flows from the
violation of the child's right to self-determination is, of course, that of diminished
childhood. Thus, for Justice Handler, both the fundamental right that is violated,
and the injury that flows from that violation, adhere to the child, wholly apart from
any damages flowing to the parents for injuries sustained by them. This formulation enabled Justice Handler to assert that the court could recognize an independent cause of action in the child, in contrast to the majority's approach, wherein the
child's right is little more than an extension of the parents' right. There is a problem, however, with regard to the assertion that the child has a fundamental right of
personal autonomy. In a wrongful life case, the child is yet to be born. If an unborn child has a right of personal autonomy, however, the whole basis for the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade is undermined. By definition, a right of
personal autonomy can inhere only in a person, yet Roe is premised on the assertion that an unborn child is not a person within the meaning of the Constitution.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-60. If an unborn child were deemed to be a person, then
abortion would have an entirely different legal status.
165 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
166 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 369, 478 A.2d at 772 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part); see
supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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ble injury underlying a wrongful life claim, Justice Schreiber
opined that a tort to the child does not in fact exist.' 67 Accordshould not have granted reingly, he maintained that the court
68
covery for damages of any kind.'

Justice Schreiber began his analysis by concurring with the
majority's position denying general damages.' 69 He based his conclusion on the idea that man cannot know whether a child born
with defects " 'would have been better off not to have been
born.' " 70 By quoting from Justice Weintraub's well-known dissent in Gleitman, 17 1 he aligned himself with those who have opposed the wrongful life cause of action on those grounds.
Justice Schreiber posited that once the court has recognized
that there is no basis for a child to recover general damages, it is
unjust to allow recovery of special damages for extraordinary
medical expenses.' 7 2 To hold that the child may recover special
damages even though the underlying theory of wrongful life has
failed, he maintained, would be to violate the moral code on
which our system ofjustice is based.173 The fundamental reason
for requiring proximate causation in tort law is that it is unjust to
require defendants to pay for damages that they did not cause. 174
Yet in the wrongful life cause of action, the doctors did not cause
the child's birth defects. Therefore, according to Justice Schreiber, recovery of costs necessitated by those defects should not be
allowed.' 75 He concluded that the court should not permit its
Procanik, 97 NJ. at 370, 478 A.2d at 772 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 371-72, 478 A.2d at 773 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part).
169 Id. at 369, 478 A.2d at 772 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part).
170 Id. (quoting Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 63, 227 A.2d at 711) (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
171 See supra note 47 for the extended quotation by Justice Weintraub.
172 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 370, 478 A.2d at 772 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part).
173 Id.
174 Id. Justice Schreiber noted that there were two reasons which would justify
awards unrelated to the plaintiffs injury. The first would be to punish wanton and
willful misconduct toward the plaintiff. The second would be to deter doctors from
negligently failing to advise parents of the risks of birth defects in their unborn
children. In regard to the first circumstance, no such misconduct was present in
this case. Indeed, as Justice Schreiber noted, the majority had accepted the fact
that the doctors did not direct any misconduct toward the plaintiff. In regard to the
second, Justice Schreiber felt that allowing recovery for special damages in a
wrongful life claim would have no real deterrent effect. The costs imposed on the
defendants would be borne by the public through the medium of insurance. In
addition, parents already have a malpractice claim arising from the doctors' negligence in failing to advise them properly. Thus, any possible deterrent effect already exists. Id. at 370-71, 478 A.2d at 772-73 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part).
175 Id. at 370, 478 A.2d at 772 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part).
167
168
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sympathy for a child born with defects to cause it to ignore the
principles of responsibility and causation that underlie our system of Justice.176
Although Justices Handler and Schreiber expressed diametrically opposite views on the wrongful life cause of action, they
justifiably found common ground in their criticism of the Procanik
majority's reasoning.' 7 7 The majority failed to identify, let alone
establish, an injury cognizable at law. 178 It failed either to bring
the cause of action within the purview of traditional tort analysis
or to forge a cogent theory of its own.1 79 Instead, the majority
reached its conclusion by a series of evasions. The majority
raised what it identified as the threshold question-whether nonexistence could ever be held to be preferable to an impaired
life-only to avoid the problem by shifting its discussion to the
measurability of damages. 8 ° The court avoided the problem of
ascertaining an individual injury that is cognizable at law by shifting its focus to the family.'
Even then, the implications of the
familial tort were avoided by limiting recovery to the medical expenses shared by the family, but by ignoring the emotional burdens. 8 2 As a consequence, the familial tort was not developed as
a concept in its own right. Rather, it was utilized simply for the
purpose of justifying special damages and then abandoned when
its logic pointed toward general damages. 183
This lack of consistency or logic, however, does not necessarily invalidate the decision. It simply indicates that the result
was reached on another basis. The majority itself made this explicit when it stated that "[flaw is more than an exercise in logic,"
4
and that logic must yield when the result would be an injustice.18
Thus, the court itself invited the conclusion that its decision was
based upon principles of equity.
What precisely is the injustice that the court sought to remedy? In his dissent, Justice Schreiber stated that it was unjust to
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

at 371-72, 478 A.2d at 773 (Schreiber, J., dissenting in part).
supra note 142 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying note 136.
supra text accompanying note 137.
Procanik, 97 N.J. at 349-51, 478 A.2d at 760-62.
supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
supra text accompanying notes 119-20.
supra text accompanying notes 114-16 & 124-25. An attempt at a more
complete exploration of the so-called familial tort, including recognition of the
right to recover for emotional damages, is carried out by Justice Handler in his
dissent. See supra text accompanying notes 134-54.
184 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 351-52, 478 A.2d at 762.
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require the defendants to pay for damages they did not cause.' 8 5
The majority, on the contrary, determined that it was unjust to
impose upon parents the "crushing burden of extraordinary expenses" if they were precluded from bringing suit.' 8 6 The majority further stated that the case subjudice illustrated just that point.
Because the parents' action was time barred, there would be no
recovery unless a cause of action could be brought by the
child.' 87
The argument that recognition of the wrongful life cause of
action is needed in order to assure recovery was also used by the
Turpin and Harbeson courts.' This lends weight to Justice Handler's contention that the cause of action was not recognized in
its own right, but only as an extension of the parents' right to
recover. 18 9 To the extent that the Procanik decision is read in this
light, its precedential value will be limited. 90 Other courts sharing these equitable concerns will be encouraged to join in recognizing the wrongful life cause of action. The cause of action will
remain limited, however, to an award for special damages where
such recovery is not available to the parents. By establishing this
limitation, recognition of the wrongful life action will be the final
development in this area of tort law.' 9 '
The true basis of the Procanik decision, however, extends beyond simply providing assurance of recovery when the parents'
claim is precluded. When faced with a problem of this kind,
courts generally can find an equitable way to restore the parents'
claim.' 92 Certainly, in addressing the equitable needs of an indi185 See supra text accompanying note 174.

Procanik, 97 N.J. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762.
Id.
188 See supra text accompanying note 78; see also supra note 83.
189 See supra text accompanying note 144. Only some of the damages which the
parents may recover on their own behalf are assured by extending the right of recovery to the child. The parents may recover for emotional damages, but the child
may not.
190 See supra note 138.
191 This line of development began with Roe, which recognized the mother's right
to abort, and continued through to Berman and Schroeder, which recognized the
wrongful birth cause of action.
192 This was done in a recent case decided by the Texas Supreme Court, Nelson
v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984). The Nelson court held that the infant plaintiff had no cause of action for wrongful life. Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 925. At the same
time, it invalidated a medical malpractice statute of limitations which barred the
parents' claim for wrongful birth. Id. at 923. In the Procanik case, the parents argued that their claim was not time-barred, on the grounds that it was derivative of
the child's claim. The court felt constrained from accepting this view, however,
noting that it had declared just three years earlier, in Schroeder, that the parents'
186
187
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vidual case, it is simpler and more appropriate to revive the parents' claim than to create an entirely new cause of action in the
child, especially where the cause of action is as controversial as a
claim for wrongful life. Thus, the very fact that the Procanik court
chose to recognize the infant's cause of action indicates that it
believed there was a deeper injustice involved-one that went to
the heart of the wrongful life claim-the infant plaintiff's life
itself.
Although the Procanik court was restrained from declaring
that the plaintiff's life could be an injury cognizable at law, it is
clear that the majority believed that such an impaired life was an
injustice, one that the majority would compensate by allowing
special damages. This is demonstrated by the court's comments
regarding its denial of recovery for general damages. While a rationale was provided for this denial, 9 3 the court stated openly
that "[u]nderlying our conclusion is an evaluation of the judicial
system to appraise such a claim."' 94 The claim of the plaintiffthat he would be better off if he had never been born-was rejected, not because it was impossible to affirm, or was contrary to
public policy, but because "[s]uch a claim would stir the passions
ofjurors about the nature and value of life, the fear of non-existence, and about abortion."' 95 The court concluded that "[this]
mix is more than the judicial system can digest."'' 96 By employing
that language, the court clearly signaled that nonexistence could
be regarded as preferable to an impaired life, and that a negligent act that allowed such life to come into existence could be an
injustice, even though the act did not cause the impairment itself.
These underlying conclusions were not made the basis of the decision, however, because of the court's estimation that the judicial system was incapable of dealing with these issues.
This leads inevitably to question the position the court might
take if it decided that the judicial system had developed that capacity. The Procanik decision itself, with its partial recognition of
claim was independent. See Procanik, 97 N.J. at 356, 478 A.2d at 764. Whether the
court would have been so constrained had it wished to revive the parents' claim, or
whether it could have found another means for doing so, are moot questions. In
any case, the Procaniks were not without recourse. Even if the court could find no
way to revive their claim for wrongful birth, they still had a claim for legal malpractice, arising out of the failure to bring an action for wrongful birth within the required time.
193 See supra text accompanying note 125.
194 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 354, 478 A.2d at 763.
195

Id.

196 Id.
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the wrongful life cause of action, could help to prepare the system in this way, as would recognition of wrongful life claims by
other courts. 197 Dicta in the Procanik decision indicates that the
supreme court would be willing to take notice of any increased
judicial capacity and to give it broader effect.' 9 8 In that event, the
Procanik decision would not be the final development of this area
of tort law, but rather would be a step in its further evolution.
It is impossible to predict with certainty the specific holdings
that would result from future judicial initiatives in this area. One
possible development might be a broadening of recovery under
the wrongful life claim. There is no logical reason for not allowing general damages for pain and suffering, as is done routinely in medical malpractice cases, once the threshold problem
regarding the relative value of impaired life has been overcome.
In addition, it is foreseeable that the court could adopt Justice
Handler's view regarding the familial tort and thus extend recovery to damages arising from a diminished childhood. Another
possibility, however, would be the development of judicial decisions covering a range of issues beyond that of an infant plaintiffs wrongful life. These issues include both suicide and
euthanasia,1 99 and are currently grouped together under the general rubric of a right to die.20 0 It is in this highly volatile area that
the most serious implications of the Procanik decision lie.
In considering these controversial issues, the New Jersey
Supreme Court could adopt the arguments presented by Justice
Handler in his dissent. Utilizing the concepts of both personal
autonomy and the familial tort, the court could both broaden the
wrongful life action and develop a right to die applicable to other
claims and issues. 20 ' These concepts, however, present their own
197 Since Procanik was decided, only one other state supreme court has considered the wrongful life cause of action. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.
1984).
198 Procanik, 97 N.J. at 354, 478 A.2d at 763. In addition, dicta in Turpin indicates
that the California Supreme Court would also be prepared to base future decisions
on an explicit rejection of the public policy that an impaired life is always preferable
to nonexistence. See supra text accompanying notes 73 & 74.
199 Euthanasia has potential application to many groups, including the terminally
ill, those suffering great pain, infants born with birth defects, and the nonfunctional
elderly.
200 See supra note 157.
201 Although not basing its decision on Justice Handler's dissent in Procanik, the
New Jersey Supreme Court developed a right to die in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209 (1985). In that decision, the court held that life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn or withheld from a nursing home patient who suffers from
severe and permanent impairments and a limited life expectancy. If the patient is

906

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:880

difficulties, and as a result, the court is unlikely to adopt this approach.20 2 Nevertheless, recognition of a right to die could be
based in part on the court's determination that under certain circumstances nonexistence is preferable to an impaired life.
Although the Procanik decision does not rest explicitly on this
conclusion, both the influence of the holding itself and the
court's dicta lead in this direction. Therefore, the Procanik decision should not be viewed just as an equitable remedy, but rather
as an incremental advance in the creation of a right to die.
Rollin A. Stearns, Jr.
competent, he may make the choice regarding treatment. Id. at 355, 486 A.2d at
1226. If the patient is not competent, a substitute decisionmaker may make the
choice under a variety of tests. These tests are based on the degree to which it can
be determined whether the patient would have declined treatment and the degree
to which the burdens of the patient's continued life outweigh the benefits. Id. at
360-61, 365-67, 486 A.2d at 1229, 1232.
202 See supra notes 151-52 & 164.

